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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
in the highest court of Georgia for five years. His application was refused, as it
appeared that at least half of his five years of practice in Georgia had been spent
working and living outside of that state. Upon appeal the Court of Appeals
affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division acted within its discretionary powers
in ruling that petitioner did not show compliance with the residence requirements
as laid down in Matter of Lerch.la
"The period of five years, during which the applicant must have practiced
in another state, assumes the fact that he also resided there during that time."'14
Applying this rule in the instant case the court felt that one who seeks admission
to the New York Bar without examination because he has been a member of the
Bar of another State must have resided, continuously or substantially so, in that
other jurisdiction for five years. The Court further implied that it was within the
discretionary powers of the Appellate Division to determine if this provision had
been complied with.
The new Court of Appeals Rule, which embodies this residence requirement,
states that "in its discretion, the Appellate Division may admit to the Bar and
license to practice without examination a person who ... while residing in such
other state ... has actually practiced for a period of at least five years in its highest
court ..."15 This new rule is intended to have the same meaning and effect as
former rule II as heretofore construed and applied.10 Thus it appears that the
present state of law in this area is as it was under the former rule II as construed
by the Lerch dicta.
Peaceful Picketing
The perennial problem of peaceful picketing found its way to the Court of
Appeals under rather unusual circumstances in Wood v. O'Grady,17 where a union
had been picketing a retail liquor store for almost two years. In spite of the
length of time involved, and the wording of the signs carried by the pickets,18
the Court found that this was organizational picketing and thus not subject to
injunction.' 9
13. 280 N. Y. 74, 19 N. E. 2d 788 (1939).
14. Id. at 75, 19 N. E. 2d at 789.
15. Court of Appeals Rule VII-1 (eff. June 15, 1955).
16. 309 N. Y. at 47, 127 N. E. 2d at 801.
17. 307 N. Y. 532, 122 N. E. 2d 386 (1954).
18. "The employees of this store are non-union. Please do not patronize this
non-union store. We are members of the A. F. of L., Local 122 of AFL."
19. The Appellate Division was reversed; 283 App. Div. 83, 129 N. Y. S. 2d
408 (1st Dep't 1954).
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The really difficult problem in this area, that of federal preemption,20 does
not arise in this case-it was not alleged that this business was in interestate
commerce-so the Taft-Hartley Act is not involved. The Federal Constitution
provides a general sort of protection of picketing,21 as does also the State Constitu-
tion,22 which is spelled out a little farther in state statutes. 23 Organizational
picketing in which the supposed object of the union is to organize the employees
of the picketed establishment, has been almost universally protected in New York
for at least the past three decades.24 Recognitional picketing, in which the object
of the union is to force the employer to recognize it as the sole bargaining agent
for his employees even though the employees have not voted on the matter, is of
course illegaL25 The difficulty in distinguishing between these two activities,
particularly when there is authority for the proposition that no real distinction
exists,206 has often bothered the courts. The problem is highlighted by the
numerous decisions which allow a union to continue picketing but with a change
in the wording of the signs.27
The decision in the instant case would seem to establish organizational
as a legal operation no matter how long it has been carried on at one place of
business, or how few employees are involved.28 However, the matter may not be
as firmly decided as it would appear to be at first glance. The opinion of the court
speaks for only two judges; Judge Desmond concurred in a separate opinion, and
Judge Fuld agreed with the result in still another opinion. The other three judges
were united in their dissent. In the second place, the case is seriously weakened
by the fact that the employer alleged no damages, 29 much less the irreparable
damages that are usually reckoned a sine qua non in injunction cases. Finally, the
employer threatened to fire his employees if they joined the union, made numerous
disparaging remarks in public about the union, and engaged in other similar
20. See Comment, Jurisdiction and Free Speech Problems in Peaceful
Picketing, 4 BUFFALO L. REv. 232 (1955), which also deals at greater length with
the problems involved in the instant case.
21. U. S. CONsT. amend. 1, the freedom of speech clause.
22. N. Y. CONST. art. I § 17: "Employees shall have the right to organize and
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing."
23. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 876-a, which declares that injunctions shall not
issue except under certain specified conditions in cases arising out of "a labor
dispute." N. Y. LABoR LAW § 703: "Employees shall have the right of self-organ-
ization . , . free from interference, restraint, or coercion of employers ... " See
N. Y. LABoR LAw § 700 for a broad statement of policy along these lines.
24. May's Furs and Ready to Wear v. Bauer, 282 N. Y. 331, 26 N. E. 2d 279(19140); Exchange Bakery & ,Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130
(1927).
25. N. Y. LABOR LAW § 704; S. & H. Grossinger, Inc., v. Burke, 124 N. Y. S. 2d
40 (1953); Holiday Bakers v. Motta, 132 N. Y. S. 2d 8 (1954).
26. Petro, Recognition and Organizational Picketing in 1952, 2 LAB. L. J.
819; Saperstein v. Rich, 202 Misc. 923, 114 N. Y. S. 2d 779 (1952).
27. Dinny & Robbins v. Davis, 290 N. Y. 101, 48 N. E. 2d 280; La Manna v.
O'Grady, 278 App. Div. 77, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 476 (1st Dep't 1951).
28. In the instant case there were three employees.
29. 307 N. Y. at 537, 541, 122 N. E. 2d at 388, 390.
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practices to the extent that he was guilty of at least one unfair labor practice
himself;30 this made difficult the showing of clean hands which equity requires.
Had any damages been alleged, or had the employer come into court with clean
hands, the tenor of all the majority opinions suggests that the result might have
been different, and that the Court might have looked a little harder to find
recognitional picketing if no other pathway to an injunction had presented itself.
It is suggested that management visions of a return to the unhappy days of
Thornhill v. Alabama3 ' are unduly pessimistic.
Militia
In Nistal v. Hausauer,32 a former national guardsman brought a proceeding
under Article 78 of the Civil Practice Act 3 against the commanding general of the
National Guard, to compel issuance of an honorable discharge in place of the
"discharge without honor," which had been given under the signature of the
commanding general, as Chief of Staff, with the accompanying recital that the
action was "By the Command of the Governor." The Special Term3 4 dismissed
the proceeding on the ground that the relief demanded was beyond the jurisdiction
of the court, and in the power of the Governor only. The Appellate Division35
reversed, seeing the act of discharge by the officer as judicial rather than executive
in quality, and therefore reviewable by certiorari.30 The Court of Appeals reversed
the Appellate Division, basing its decision on lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, since a purely executive function was involved.37
The commanding general is also head of the State's Division of Military and
Naval Affairs. By statute, it is provided that the Governor may perform his duties
as Commander in Chief through that Division.38 The kind of discharge to be given
an enlisted man is not controlled by statute and "musq necessarily be left in the
30. N. Y. LABoR LAW § 704 (10).
31. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940), in which picketing was
equated with speech and therefore protected, was soon drastically limited by along line of cases. See Comment, op. cit. supra note 20.
32. 308 N. Y. 146, 124 N. E. 2d 94 (1954).
33. Proceeding against a body or officer.
34. 203 Misc. 89, 115 N. Y. S. 2d 75 (1952).
35. 282 App. Div. 7, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 712 (1st Dep't 1953).36. Article 78 was enacted in 1937. Prior thereto, the Civil Practice Act con-
tained provisions separately governing the special proceedings theretofore known
as certiorari to review, mandamus and prohibition. The old terms live on.37. A proceeding against a body or officer does not lie to review a legislative
or executive function. Neddio v. Schrade, 270 N. Y. 97, 200 N. E. 657 (1936);
Matter of Long Island 1. R. v. Hylan, 240 N. Y. 199, 148 N. E. 189 (1925). A
decision made by the Governor, or by his order, is not subject to review. People
ex rel. Broderick v. Morton, 156 N. Y. 136, 50 N. E. 791 (1898).
38. See N. Y. CONST. art. IV, § 3; N. Y. MiLiTARY LAW §§ 3, 10, 11; N. Y.
ExEcuTivE LAW § 190.
